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Abstract 
Recent political discussions about the possible advantages of first-mover behaviour in terms of 
environmental policy again called attention to the well-established controversy about the effects 
of environmental regulation on international competitiveness. Conventional theory claims that 
the trade-off between regulation and competitiveness will be negative while the revisionist 
view, also known as the Porter Hypothesis, argues for the opposite. Several previous attempts 
that analysed this quarrel by means of strategic trade game settings indeed support the former 
claim and conclude that, to increase a firm’s competitiveness, ecological dumping is the most 
likely outcome in a Cournot duopoly configuration. However, these results were derived from 
one period games in which so-called innovation offsets are unlikely to occur. The present paper 
considers a two-period model that includes an intertemporally growing firm-level knowledge 
capital. In doing so the accumulation of knowledge is modelled in a unilateral and a bilateral 
variant. It is shown that for both scenarios in period 1 the domestic government will set a higher 
emission tax rate compared to its foreign counterpart. Furthermore, we identify conditions for 
which the domestic tax rate will be set above the Pigouvian level in period 1 in both model vari-
ants. 
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1.  Introduction 
Usually, the establishment of environmental policies is subject to a considerable debate 
concerning their impact on the competitiveness of thus affected firms, industries or even 
whole nations. The elusiveness of the notion competitiveness notwithstanding, the aca-
demic dispute on this quarrel has spawned two diametrical opposed views. The classic 
view argues that environmental regulation inevitably creates costs of compliance which 
accordingly lower any previously held comparative advantage in using the environment 
as a factor of production (Palmer et al. 1995). By contrast the revisionist perception, 
also known as the Porter Hypothesis, posits that stringent incentive-based regulation 
indeed may produce a welfare-maximising win-win situation in which both the envi-
ronment and the economy benefit (Porter 1991, Porter & van der Linde 1995a, 1995b). 
Although the latter view has its argumentative merits it lacks a thorough theoretical 
fundament. However, it is widely held that the revisionist view is founded on the belief 
that market-based environmental regulation provokes a thorough search for innovative 
solutions to the problem of increasing compliance costs. In this sense an increase of 
competitiveness is an increase in productivity: successfully induced innovations trigger 
a decrease of a firm’s marginal costs (Simpson & Bradford 1996). Hence, a decline in 
marginal costs is the sufficient condition for a higher competitiveness while a cost-
reducing innovation serves as the necessary condition. The notion of stringency, in turn, 
commonly refers to an environmental policy set above the according Pigouvian level. 
Consequently, the questions if and how innovations under a scenario of stringent regula-
tion emerge prove to be essential for a sound analysis of the Porter Hypothesis. 
Empirical evidence for Porter’s assertions is mixed: while older studies mostly find ei-
ther no or only a small negative correlation between stringent regulation and some 
proxy for competitiveness (see the surveys by Jaffe et al. 1995, Jeppesen et al. 1999 and 
Mulatu et al. 2001)2 more recent evidence suggests that a positive link between regula-
tion and patenting (Lanjouw & Mody 1996), private R&D expenditures (Jaffe & Palmer 
1997), productivity (Berman & Bui 2001) and technical efficiency (Murty & Kumar 
2003) exists. 
Analytical evidence is also ambiguous. The basic argument against the assertions of the 
Porter Hypothesis is that the possibility of a systematic free or even paid lunch is highly 
unlikely (Palmer et al. 1995). Indeed, the widely used strategic environmental policy 
models, which are based upon the seminal strategic trade models (Spencer & Brander 
1983, Brander & Spencer 1985), usually find that ecological dumping is the most likely 
                                                 
2  It has to be noted that most of the older studies rely on evidence from times when mainly command 
and control regulation was issued. However, such data cannot be readily used to analyse the Porter 
Hypothesis as Porter calls for market-based policies (Wagner 2003). 
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outcome (cf. Barrett 1994, Rauscher 1994). In doing so they draw some important con-
clusions: usually a range of ambiguous effects (e.g. rent-shifting vs. innovation effects) 
shape the ultimate outcome of such a game (Ulph & Ulph 1996). Depending on the 
properties of the utilised functions results differ largely: while for some constellations 
so-called innovation offsets are conceivable they do not take place in other cases (Simp-
son & Bradford 1996). This hints at the sensibility of such models for analysing the 
regulation-competitiveness interdependency.  
The Porter Hypothesis is derived from the basic insight that competitiveness, and its 
sibling the national competitive advantage, is created and not inherited like a classic 
endowment with production factors (Porter 1990). Sure enough this view is not com-
pletely new. Based on the “Kaldor paradox”3 Fagerberg (1988, 1996) identifies techno-
logical advance as the main driver for a nation’s competitiveness. Applying this finding 
to a dual dimension approach (cf. Dollar 1993, Ezeala-Harrison 2005) then leads to a 
framework in which firm-level competitiveness is based upon technological or knowl-
edge advantages and national competitiveness is bolstered by an institutional framework 
that encourages and supports the generation of new profitable knowledge. 
The Porter Hypothesis follows this rationale and asserts that market-based environ-
mental regulation establishes an exogenous pressure which induces the affected firms to 
conduct R&D to offset the compliance costs (Porter & van der Linde 1995a, 1995b). 
The basic idea that environmental regulation induces innovation has been widely ac-
knowledged (Zerbe 1970, Magat 1978, Downing & White 1986, Milliman & Prince 
1989, Jung et al. 1996, Fischer et al. 2003) while the notion of innovation offsets so far 
seems only possible when one attenuates the restrictive assumptions of neo-classical 
theory (Ayres 1994, Gabel & Sinclair-Desgagné 1999). In the revisionist view such 
innovation offsets constitute the first cornerstone of the hypothesis. The second and so 
far widely neglected cornerstone is the first-mover effect. It states that a domestic firm 
which is affected by a novel and stringent environmental regulation needs to adjust im-
mediately to this exogenous pressure while its foreign rival at this point still operates 
under a comparatively lax regulation. Intuition suggests that such an early adjustment 
indeed increases costs in the short-run but these may as well decrease in the long-run. 
We hypothesise that such an outcome can only be brought about when the notion of 
knowledge accumulation is considered4: By leaving the boundary of a one-period game 
early R&D expenditures may also influence later knowledge capital if one assumes that 
                                                 
3  Since the occurrence of the “Kaldor paradox” measures like unit labour costs have been viewed as an 
inappropriate indicator for competitiveness (Kaldor 1978). 
4  Another way to achieve a fulfilment of the Porter Hypothesis is to view the black box of firm decision 
making as defective. The latter e.g. requires agency problems, bounded rationality or path dependen-
cies. 
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intratemporal knowledge capital does not get entirely lost intertemporally. Moreover, 
the accumulation of knowledge capital appears to be especially suited for capturing the 
properties of process-integrated innovations which are especially advocated in the Por-
ter Hypothesis. However, it is obvious that the benefits of long-term knowledge accu-
mulation and possibly ensuing innovation offsets cannot be properly analysed in a one-
period setting because the accumulation of knowledge involves a technological trajec-
tory which cannot be fully captured in one period. Since each period yields instantane-
ous conditions for optimality at a certain point in time the time path is neglected. Hence, 
future cost reductions that stem from early investments will be underestimated. 
Thus, to evaluate whether a first-mover effect is a decisive constituent one needs to ex-
tend the popular one-period model by at least a second period (Taistra 2000, Feess & 
Taistra 2000, Feess & Muehlheusser 2002)5. For instance, in their two-period model 
Feess and Muehlheusser (2002) show that an environmental service sector that is sub-
ject to an intertemporal learning curve effect benefits from early and even stringent 
regulation. Given that this model misses the basic consideration of the Porter Hypothe-
sis – the polluting firms shall be induced to invest in process-integrated R&D – it never-
theless hints at the importance of incorporating growing knowledge. 
Our model follows the previous arguments: we construe a two-period model in the line 
of strategic environmental policy games. Thereby we allow for an analysis of the first-
mover effect by introducing a growing firm-level knowledge capital. Our investigation 
commences with a basic model with unilateral knowledge accumulation and subse-
quently allows for bilateral knowledge accumulation. In doing so our aim is twofold: 
First, we analyse whether the domestic government will set a higher tax rate than its 
foreign counterpart in period 1. Second, we identify the conditions under which the do-
mestic tax rate is set above the Pigouvian level in period 1. 
Section 2 explicates the configuration of our model and introduces its basic version with 
unilateral knowledge accumulation. Section 3 then extends the analysis by allowing for 
bilateral knowledge accumulation. Section 4 presents our conclusions. 
2.  The Basic Model with Unilateral Knowledge Accumulation 
We consider a two-period Cournot game in which an duopoly produces a homogenous 
consumption good. The two firms are located in two different countries. Production of 
the good entails the creation of environmentally harmful emissions. Each country also 
                                                 
5  The model by Taistra (2000) and the ensuing model by Feess and Taistra (2000) – both are discrete 
models – have a major shortcoming: The decision of the foreign government to adopt the domestic en-
vironmental policy is not strategic as it depends on an exogenous probability. 
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harbours an governmental agency that aims at maximising welfare by internalising the 
external effect of pollution. To do so it sets a tax rate per units of emission. 
The game comprises two periods, each containing three stages. Due to the specific se-
quence of the game it can be solved via backwards induction beginning with stage 6 
(that is the third stage in period two). In the respective third stages the firms choose 
their equilibrium quantities. They take the choice variables of the other stages as given. 
The output is then sold on a third country’s market which allows for the omission of 
consumer surplus in the welfare functions.6 In the second stages firms choose their level 
of emission-reducing expenditures. As will be shortly explicated the basic model differ-
entiates between the domestic and the foreign extent of knowledge capitalisation. That 
is, by deciding on the optimal amount of according R&D expenditures the domestic 
firm also set its intratemporal and partly determines its intertemporal knowledge capital 
while the foreign firm may only invest intratemporally. In the first stages the govern-
ments choose a welfare maximising tax rate. Figure 1 summarises the sequence of the 
game. 
 
 
Figure 1: The sequence of the game 
2.1.  Notations and functional relationships 
Unless otherwise noted in section 3 the following assumptions hold for both versions of 
the model. Generally, the model is symmetrical except for the asymmetric treatment of 
knowledge parameters. These asymmetries are needed to motivate a domestic first-
mover behaviour. An entirely symmetrical constellation would not allow to analyse the 
Porter Hypothesis whose realisation necessitates a difference in at least one decisive 
parameter. Put in other words, an optimising policymaker needs a lever to initiate a re-
spective action, in the present model the choice of an emission tax rate. Except for the 
necessary inclusion of a particular asymmetric modification the assumption of symme-
try prevails which shall allow to single out the decisive effects. 
                                                 
6  Omitting consumer surplus is a common assumption in strategic environmental policy games (cf. 
Simpson & Bradford 1996, Ulph & Ulph 1996). 
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In the following superscripts i,j refer to domestic (d) and foreign (f) while subscripts 
t=1,2 refer to period one and two, respectively. 
 
Inverse demand: Firms face the downward-sloping inverse demand function ( )jtit qqP ,  
for the consumption good on the third country market. 
 
 ( ) 0<⋅′P ; ( ) 0≤⋅′′P  (1) 
 
Emissions: The emissions of firm i in period t are denoted  and given by the function ite( )ititit qe κ, . Hence, they depend on , the produced quantities of the consumption good 
by firm i in period t and , firm i’s knowledge capital in period t. Emissions are as-
sumed to be solely local. The following properties apply: 
i
tq
i
tκ
 
 ( ) 00 22 =∂∂>∂∂ itititit qeqe  (2) 
 ( ) 00 22 >∂∂<∂∂ itititit ee κκ  (3) 
 
Assumptions (2) and (3) define that emissions are linear in quantities and strictly con-
vex in knowledge capital. The linear property arises to avoid ambiguities in the com-
parative static analyses of the following stages. Due to the convexity property returns 
form growing knowledge capital in reducing emissions are diminishing. 
 
Costs: Each firm has the cost function ( )itititi tqC κ,,  with  denoting firm i’s quantity 
of the output of the consumption good in period t,  denoting country i’s tax rate in 
period t and  denoting firm i’s knowledge capital in period t. The following proper-
ties apply: 
i
tq
i
tt
i
tκ
 
 ( ) 00 22 =∂∂>∂∂ itiiti qCqC  (4) 
 ( ) 00 22 ≤∂∂>∂∂ itiiti tCtC  (5) 
 ( ) 00 22 >∂∂<∂∂ itiiti CC κκ  (6) 
 
By the previous assumptions costs are linear in output, concave in taxes and strictly 
convex in knowledge capital. Assumption (4) implies that the production process is sub-
ject to constant returns to scale. The concavity property in assumption (5) captures a 
linear as well as a concave relation between costs and the respective tax rate. The latter 
may arise if (5) also includes the indirect effects of an increasing tax rate (that is, the 
marginal effect of a growing tax rate on costs is decreasing since, as will be proofed 
later, an intensified tax policy results in less quantities which reduces production costs). 
The convexity in (6) follows from (3). 
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Knowledge Capital: The knowledge capital  accrues from R&D expenditures . In 
this basic version of the model knowledge accumulation only occurs in the domestic 
country. This rather restrictive assumption may be explained by different approaches to 
emission reduction. The foreign firm is only capable to invest in an end-of-pipe tech-
nology. In each period costs of installation, maintenance and disposal of the device (e.g. 
a filter) occur. The domestic firm, however, invests in a process-integrated technology. 
In so doing it is able to accumulate knowledge about the novel technology over time, 
that is, the domestic firm improves its technology continuously. Note that, strictly 
speaking, the foreign firm does not invest in something like knowledge capital since an 
externally procured end-of-pipe device does not qualify as an outcome of any knowl-
edge-based activities on behalf of the foreign firm.
i
tκ itI
7 Thus, in this basic version  can 
also be interpreted as emission-reducing expenditures because ultimately the process-
integrated technology as well as the end-of-pipe approach aim at curtailing environ-
mental harm. 
i
tI
 
For period 1 ( )iii I111 κκ =  applies for both firms: 
 
  (7) ii I11 ⋅= ακ
 
The parameter 0>α  measures the effect of R&D expenditures on knowledge capital in 
period 1 (that is, the success of R&D expenditures). 
For period 2 ( )( )dddd I2122 ,⋅= κκκ  applies for the domestic firm while the foreign firm 
faces ( )fff I222 κκ = : 
 
 ( ) ddd I212 ⋅+⋅= βκκ  ;   (8) ff I22 ⋅= ακ
 
The parameter 0>β  measures the domestic effect of R&D expenditures on knowledge 
capital in period 2. (8) therefore implies βκ =∂∂ dd I22  and ακ =∂∂ dd I12 . Furthermore, 
we assume βα >  (early units of R&D are more effective in creating knowledge capital 
than later units which is tantamount to decreasing returns of knowledge capital). Hence, 
the foreign firm in period 2 still benefits from a knowledge effect with the strength α , 
but it is not able to utilize period 1 knowledge capital since it invests in an end-of-pipe 
technology. The domestic firm, however, can access accumulated knowledge, whose 
strength is then measured by βα + . 
 
Environmental Harm: Environmental harm is captured in the damage function ( )iteD : 
 
                                                 
7  To avoid undue verbiage this differentiation will be suppressed throughout the text. Therefore, for the 
foreign firm the notion of knowledge capital is restricted to manners of end-of-pipe abatement. 
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 ( ) 00 22 ≥∂∂>∂∂ itit eDeD  (9) 
 
Assumption (9) says that environmental damage is convex in emissions which, of 
course, includes the possibility that marginal environmental damage is linear. 
 
Objective functions: 
 
Third stages (Firms maximise their profits  and thusly obtain optimal quantities.): itΠ
 
 max  ( ) ( )itititiitjtitit tqCqqqP κ,,, −⋅=Π  (10) 
 
Second stages (Firms maximise their profits  and determine their equilibrium R&D 
expenditures.): 
i
tΠ
 
 max  ( ) ( ) ititititiitjtitit ItqCqqqP −−⋅=Π κ,,,  (11) 
 
First stages (Governments maximise national welfare  and choose the optimal tax 
policy.): 
i
tΦ
 
 max  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )⋅⋅+⋅−−−⋅=Φ itititititititiitjtitit eteDItqCqqqP κ,,,  (12) 
 
Stability: Stability requires the determinant of the Hessian (where  denotes the respec-
tive strategic variable in country i in period t) to be positive which is tantamount to own 
effects dominating cross-effects: 
i
ts
 
 ( ) ( ) ititititdtft
f
t
f
t
d
t
d
t
f
t
f
t
d
t
d
t
s tIqsssssss
H ,,0
22
2
2
2
2
=>∂
Π∂⋅∂
Π∂−∂
Π∂⋅∂
Π∂=  with  (13) 
 
Strategic Substitutes: 
 
 0<∂∂Π∂ jtitit qq  (14) 
 
Due to the previous assumptions (14) restates the conventional Cournot result that do-
mestic and foreign quantities are strategic substitutes. 
 
Furthermore, we assume that all respective second-order conditions are satisfied. This 
implies that emissions are sufficiently convex in knowledge capital.8 Thus, all objective 
functions are strictly concave. Finally, a stringent tax policy or tax rate henceforth refers 
to a tax rate that is set above the according intratemporal Pigouvian level. 
                                                 
8  See the discussion of the comparative static analysis in section 2.2. 
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2.2.  Decisions in period 2 
In stage 6 both firms choose their output quantities. They do so by differentiating (10) 
with respect to quantities. This yields the following first-order conditions which implic-
itly define the Nash-Equilibrium in quantities (assuming that an interior solution exists): 
 
 
( ) ( ) 0
2
2
22
2 =∂
∂−⋅+⋅∂
⋅∂=∂
Π∂
i
i
i
ii
i
q
CPq
q
P
q
 (15) 
 
(15) implies the reaction functions ( )jii qqq 222~ = . Equilibrium quantities can therefore be 
written as ( )jijiii ttqq 222222 ,,,κκ= . 
The effects of the other strategic variables on quantities can be analysed by totally dif-
ferentiating the first-order conditions with respect to the domestic tax rate (see Appen-
dix A 1 for details). The results replicate the common findings 0<dtdt tq dd  and 
0>dtft tq dd . By an increase in the domestic tax rate domestic costs increase which 
entails an output cutback. And whenever domestic quantities decrease foreign quantities 
partly fill the gap and increase. 
 
To assess the effects of increases in domestic R&D expenditures on quantities the first-
order conditions need to be totally differentiated with respect to domestic R&D expen-
ditures (see Appendix A 2 for details). Via the cost-reducing effect of domestic R&D 
expenditures domestic quantities increase ( 0>dtdt Iq dd ). And since everything that 
decreases domestic costs also increases domestic quantities and consequently decreases 
foreign quantities dt
f
t Iq dd  is negative. 
Thus, (by virtue of the assumed demand structure) the conventional Cournot results are 
obtained, namely that 022 <∂∂ ii Cq , 022 >∂∂ ji Cq  and 02222 <∂∂+∂∂ jiii CqCq . Hence, 
even when the respective rival’s reaction is optimal total industry output declines. This 
is a direct consequence of the well-established stability condition for reaction functions: 
the absolute value of the slope of  has to be lower than the absolute value of the 
slope of  (Tirole 1988, p. 220).
f
tq~
d
tq~
9 
 
In stage 5 the firms decide on their R&D expenditures. Differentiating (11) with respect 
to R&D expenditures yields the following first-order conditions which implicitly define 
the Nash-Equilibrium in R&D expenditures (again, assuming an interior solution): 
 
                                                 
9  A sufficient condition for stability in reaction functions is 1~ <′itq  (Tirole 1988, p. 220 (footnote 15), 
Dixit 1986, pp. 109-111). 
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 ( ) ( ) 01
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
22
2 =−∂
∂⋅∂
∂−⋅∂
∂⋅∂
∂⋅′+∂
∂⋅∂
∂⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−⋅+⋅∂
⋅∂=∂
Π∂
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
f
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
dd
d
I
Cq
I
qP
I
q
q
CPq
q
P
I
κ
κ
κ
κ
κ
κ  (16) 
 1
2
2
2
2 =⋅∂
∂−⋅⋅∂
∂⋅′⇒ βκβκ d
d
d
d
f CqqP  
 
(16) shows that in equilibrium the cross effect of domestic R&D expenditures (via do-
mestic knowledge capital) on foreign quantities minus domestic cost reductions due to 
lower emissions equal the last Euro spent on R&D expenditures. From the domestic 
firm’s point of view this means that it invests in R&D until the ensuing cost reductions 
are compensated by the decline in relative revenues which result from falling market 
prices ( ). The market price falls because the negative cross effect (0<′P 022 <∂∂ ijq κ ) 
implies an increase in domestic quantities. 
 
The foreign firm’s foc is equivalent to (16) except for a different knowledge parameter: 
 
 1
2
2
2
2
2
2 =⋅∂
∂−⋅⋅∂
∂⋅′=∂
Π∂ ακακ f
f
f
f
d
f
f CqqP
I
 (17) 
 
Due to βα >  the domestic firm has an incentive to reduce its R&D expenditures in 
period 2. The foreign firm, however, has to keep up its level of according expenditures 
(if it aims at reducing the same amount of emissions as in the first period). Therefore, if 
both firms would want to avoid the same amount of emissions the domestic firm bene-
fits from comparatively lower costs since it can access its knowledge capital from pe-
riod 1.  
 
Moreover, domestic and foreign R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes because an 
increase in domestic (foreign) R&D increases domestic (foreign) quantities via the cost-
reducing effect and accordingly decreases foreign (domestic) quantities. Therefore, eve-
rything that decreases costs in one firm decreases the other firm’s quantities which also 
lowers the latter’s incentive to further reduce its costs (Ulph 1994, p. 214). Conse-
quently, strategic substitutes imply downward-sloping reaction functions which, in turn, 
determine the sign of the cross derivatives fdd II 222
2 ∂∂Π∂  and dfd II 2222 ∂∂Π∂ . 
 
Lemma 1. Downward-sloping reaction functions imply negative cross derivatives 
fdd II 222
2 ∂∂Π∂  and dfd II 2222 ∂∂Π∂ . 
 
Proof. (see Appendix A 3) 
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Thus, reaction functions can only be downward-sloping if 0222
2 <∂∂Π∂ fdd II  and 
0222
2 <∂∂Π∂ dfd II  holds. This result has important implications for the following com-
parative static analysis. 
Whether an increase in the tax rate actually induces R&D expenditures can be analysed 
by totally differentiating the second stage first-order conditions with respect to the do-
mestic tax rate. This gives rise to the following equation system: 
 
 ( )
( ) ⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
∂∂
∂
∂∂
∂
=
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
⋅
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
Π∂
∂∂
Π∂
∂∂
Π∂
∂
Π∂
d
t
f
t
f
d
t
d
t
d
d
t
f
t
d
t
d
t
f
t
f
t
d
t
f
t
f
t
f
t
d
t
d
t
d
t
d
t
tI
C
tI
C
t
I
t
I
III
III
2
2
2
22
2
2
2
d
d
d
d
 (18) 
 
Using (13) and solving (18) with Cramer’s Rule yields: 
 
 
( ) ( )
0
22
2
22
2
22
22
>
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂∂
Π∂⋅∂∂
∂−∂
Π∂⋅∂∂
∂
=∂
Π∂
∂∂
∂
∂∂
Π∂
∂∂
∂
=
I
f
t
d
t
d
t
d
t
f
t
f
f
t
f
t
d
t
d
t
d
I
f
t
f
t
d
t
f
t
f
f
t
d
t
d
t
d
t
d
t
d
d
t
d
t
H
IItI
C
ItI
C
H
ItI
C
IItI
C
t
I
d
d
 (19a) 
 
 
( )
( )
0
222
2
222
2
2
2
>
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂∂
∂⋅∂∂
Π∂−∂∂
∂⋅∂
Π∂
=∂∂
∂
∂∂
Π∂
∂∂
∂
∂
Π∂
=
I
d
t
d
t
d
d
t
f
t
f
t
d
t
f
t
f
d
t
d
t
I
d
t
f
t
f
d
t
f
t
f
t
d
t
d
t
d
d
t
d
t
d
t
f
t
H
tI
C
IItI
C
I
H
tI
C
II
tI
C
I
t
I
d
d
 (19b) 
 
Given that domestic and foreign R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes, which en-
tails 02 <∂∂Π∂ ftdtdt II , ambiguities arise due the sign of dtdtd tIC ∂∂∂2 . If emissions are 
sufficiently convex in knowledge capital it will be negative, if not it will be positive.10 
In the latter case 0<dtdt tI dd . However, for the following we will assume the opposite 
and therefore allow for tax induced innovation which is a necessary assumption to fur-
ther pursue the assertions of the Porter Hypothesis. The sign of dt
f
t tI dd  is unambigu-
ously positive since dt
f
t
f tIC ∂∂∂2  is negative because everything that increases costs 
for the domestic firm increases the foreign firm’s incentive to further reduce its costs. 
The ambiguity in dt
d
t
d tIC ∂∂∂2  does not matter due to the stability requirement (i.e. 
own effects dominate cross effects). 
 
                                                 
10 Sufficiently convex emissions imply that the effect of reduced tax payments due to diminishing emis-
sions is not again overcompensated by rising costs due to increased output. 
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Finally, in stage 4 the governments fix their period 2 tax rates. Using the fact that by 
Shepard’s Lemma it
i
t
i etC =∂∂ 11 and differentiating (12) with respect to the tax rates 
yields the following first-order conditions: 
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Solving foc (20) for the tax rate yields the optimal domestic regulation schedule in pe-
riod 2: 
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Solving foc (21) for the tax rate yields the optimal foreign regulation schedule in period 
2: 
 
                                                 
11  Using Shepard’s Lemma implies that the production function is strictly quasiconcave. 
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Several strategic effects distort the Pigouvian level at which the tax rate equals marginal 
damage. These effects will be explained on the basis of the domestic regulation sched-
ule. In combination with the unambiguously negative multiplier 
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21 κκ  (an increase in the tax rate decreases domestic quantities as 
well as emissions, hence both terms are negative) each effect shifts the optimal tax rate 
either upward or downward. 
 
Rent-shifting effect 
The positive term ( ) d
d
d
d
f
t
qPq
t
qP
2
2
2
2
2
∂
∂⋅⋅−⋅∂
∂⋅′−  shows that an increase in domestic costs  
due to a higher tax rate entails increased foreign quantities which in turn results in de-
creasing domestic quantities. However, since total industry output falls the equilibrium 
price for the commodity increases which benefits the foreign firm (that is to say, domes-
tic revenues decline). Thus, the rent-shifting effect exercises a downward pressure on 
the tax rate. 
 
Indirect rent-shifting effect 
The positive term βκ ⋅⋅∂
∂⋅∂
∂⋅′− dd
f
f
f
q
t
IqP 2
2
2
2
2  augments the rent-shifting effect through the 
ramifications of 022 >∂∂ df tI . A rise in the domestic tax rate increases foreign R&D 
expenditures because an increase in domestic costs (that is the direct effect of an in-
creasing tax rate) decreases domestic quantities and therefore increases the foreign 
firm’s incentive to further invest in cost-reducing measures. Consequently, the down-
ward pressure on the tax rate is intensified. 
 
 
Indirect innovation effect 
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The negative term βκ ⋅⋅∂
∂⋅∂
∂⋅′− dd
d
d
f
q
t
IqP 2
2
2
2
2  describes how the quantity-increasing effect 
of domestic cost-reducing innovations decreases foreign quantities. Since domestic 
quantities increase the domestic firm benefits from an increasing market price. Conse-
quently, this effect countervails the rent-shifting effects and exacts an upward pressure 
on the tax rate. 
 
Innovation effect 
The negative term βκ ⋅∂
∂⋅∂
∂
d
d
d
d
t
IC
2
2
2
 signifies the reductions in costs due to increased do-
mestic knowledge capital. This effect shifts the tax rate upwards. 
 
Innovation cost effect 
The positive term d
d
t
I
2
2
∂
∂  describes the direct cost-increasing effect of R&D expenditures 
(that is, the impact of R&D on emissions is neglected) and consequently produces a 
downward pressure on the tax rate. 
2.3.  Decisions in period 1 
In stage 3 firms set their optimal output quantities. The first order conditions in stage 3 
are simply the period 1 equivalents from the results in stage 6. 
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The previous results apply accordingly. 
 
In stage 2 firms again choose their equilibrium R&D expenditures. The foreign firm, 
being unable to benefit from knowledge accumulation, maximises its second stage ob-
jective function with respect to period 1 R&D expenditures yielding the straightforward 
replication of foc (17) from stage 5. 
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The domestic firm, however, sets its R&D expenditures by maximising intertemporal 
profits (11.1):  
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In contrast to the foreign firm’s foc (26) includes the intertemporal equivalent to (16) in 
the second row. Therefore, the satisfaction of condition (26) necessitates that both in-
tratemporal and intertemporal effects equal the last Euro spent on R&D expenditures in 
period 1. Furthermore, the knowledge effects benefiting the domestic firm are now 
measured by α . Since period 1 R&D expenditures lead to cost reductions in both peri-
ods the domestic firm faces an incentive to invest relatively more in period 1 R&D to 
benefit from the first-mover effect of early commencing with the accumulation of 
knowledge capital. 
 
In stage 1 the governments set their initial equilibrium tax rates. Again, due to the lack 
of intertemporal effects the foreign government maximises intratemporal welfare in 
period 1 while the domestic government maximises intertemporal welfare. 
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(27) then leads to the optimal foreign regulation schedule in period 1 which is, except 
for one modification, the equivalent to the result in period 2: 
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Note that when fixing its tax rate the foreign government has to consider an intertempo-
ral indirect rent-shifting effect which favours the domestic firm due to its capability to 
accumulate knowledge. 
 
Intertemporal indirect rent-shifting effect 
The positive term ακ ⋅⋅∂
∂⋅∂
∂⋅′− ff
d
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q
t
IqP 2
1
1
2
2  captures the intertemporal cross effect of in-
duced innovations. An increase in foreign period 1 taxes affects domestic R&D expen-
ditures in period 1 and therefore also the domestic period 2 knowledge capital. Hence, 
this effects lowers the foreign tax rate. 
 
The domestic firm faces the intertemporal welfare function (12.1): 
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Optimisation of  (12.1) leads to the following foc: 
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Rearranging (29) yields the domestic government’s equilibrium regulation schedule: 
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The optimal domestic tax rate in (30) has three additional effects compared to its for-
eign pendant. Both aforementioned innovation effects are augmented by intertemporal 
counterparts. The intertemporal indirect innovation effect ακ ⋅⋅∂
∂⋅∂
∂⋅′− dd
d
d
f
q
t
IqP 2
1
1
2
2  em-
phasises the intertemporal quantity-shifting in favour of the domestic firm. Furthermore, 
and more importantly, the intertemporal innovation effect ακ ⋅∂
∂⋅∂
∂
d
d
d
d
t
IC
1
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2
 demonstrates 
that an increase in period 1 taxes facilitates the cost-decreasing accumulation of knowl-
edge. Thus, the impact of early induced innovations persists. 
The policy adjustment effect ⎥⎦
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 only becomes 
effective whenever the optimal tax rate in period 2 differs from the according Pigouvian 
level (at the Pigouvian benchmark ( )dd teD 22 −∂∂  becomes zero) or when an in total 
nonzero effect appears in the brackets. Although the second term in the second paren-
thesis shows how intertemporal knowledge accumulation lowers domestic emissions in 
period 2 the very same dependency may ultimately increase total domestic emissions 
due to increased domestic output as described in the first term.12 Both effects then have 
different impacts on the optimal regulation schedule since the maximisation of welfare 
includes (1) the reduction of environmental harm – i.e. a downward (upward) pressure 
on the optimal tax rate in period 1 in case of a stringent (lax) tax policy in period 2 – 
and (2) the collection of tax revenue – i.e. an upward (downward) pressure on the opti-
                                                 
12  A dominance of the first term requires demand to be sufficiently flat so that an increase in quantities 
entails a relatively small decline in marginal revenue.  
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mal tax rate in period 1 in case of a stringent (lax) tax policy in period 2. This effect can 
therefore be interpreted as the policy adjustment process that follows from the firms’ 
measures to reduce their emissions in period 1: Less emissions means less environ-
mental damage which, from an equilibrium perspective, entails a lower tax rate in pe-
riod 2 compared to period 1.13 
Consequently, the domestic government faces a further incentive to tighten its environ-
mental regulation in period 1: Given that intertemporal innovations effects exist induc-
ing innovations early puts the domestic firm intertemporally in a better position. This 
effect may then be intensified by a downward adjustment of the tax rate in period 2. The 
domestic government can choose this option if environmental harm has already been 
reduced in period 1. Furthermore, an adjusted tax rate reduces regulation costs of the 
domestic firm in period 2 which increases its competitiveness. 
 
The previous discussion culminates in the questions (1) whether the domestic tax rate in 
period 1 will be higher than its foreign counterpart and (2) whether the domestic tax rate 
in period 1 will be set above the Pigouvian level. These questions will be addressed in 
the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1. The domestic government will set a higher tax rate in period 1 than the 
foreign government. 
 
Proof. (see Appendix A 4 for details) 
 
Since the domestic tax rate in period 1 will be higher compared to its foreign counter-
part the question of stringency remains. To highlight the difference of the two periods 
we investigate the second question in two steps. First, we analyse the domestic govern-
ment’s behaviour in period 2. Second, we turn to the stringency of its tax policy in pe-
riod 1. 
It turns out that the domestic first-order condition (20) contains two necessary condi-
tions which have to hold to allow for a stringent domestic tax policy in period 2. Fur-
thermore, these conditions constitute a hierarchy which follows the rationale of the in-
novation effect in the Porter Hypothesis. First, the benefits from cost-reducing innova-
tion must outweigh according R&D expenditures which is tantamount to the existence 
                                                 
13  To be sure, the adjustment effect emanates because the whole game is about finding the optimal envi-
ronmental policy. Contrary to such an optimisation approach the agency may want to gradually 
strengthen its policy to maintain the incentive to reduce emissions (or substitute input factors). 
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of an innovation effect. Second, innovation offsets have to occur which is tantamount to 
the predominance of the innovation effect over any rent-shifting.14 
 
Proposition 2. The domestic government will set a tax rate above the Pigouvian level in 
period 2 if the existence condition for an innovation effect and the predominance condi-
tion for an innovation offset hold. 
 
Proof. (see Appendix A 5) 
 
It is evident that the domestic government will only set a stringent tax policy in period 2 
for a sufficiently high value of the knowledge parameter. This result may then be inter-
preted as the replication of the common finding that a stringent tax policy remains 
unlikely in a one-period game. 
The intertemporal analysis, however, emphasises the ramifications of unilateral knowl-
edge accumulation. The two additional intertemporal innovation effects imply that the 
conditions for dd eDt 11 ∂∂>  are weaker than in the former case since early R&D re-
duces domestic costs in both periods. However, an additional condition has to be intro-
duced to capture the impact of the policy adjustment effect. This condition does not 
directly interfere with the aforementioned hierarchy of necessary conditions. 
 
Proposition 3. The domestic government will set a tax rate above the Pigouvian level in 
period 1 if the policy adjustment condition, the existence condition for an innovation 
effect, and the predominance condition for an innovation offset hold. 
 
Proof. (see Appendix A 6) 
 
The intertemporal analysis shows that the unilateral ability of the domestic firm to ac-
cumulate knowledge results in weaker conditions for the existence of an innovation ef-
fect and for the predominance of  the innovation effects over the rent-shifting effects. 
This means that innovation offsets in the spirit of the revisionist view are more likely 
when knowledge accumulation is considered. Moreover, the policy adjustment condi-
tion provides a further comparative cost advantage for the domestic firm in period 2 
since its regulation costs decrease due the downward adjustment of the optimal domes-
tic tax rate. 
                                                 
14  An innovation offset is defined as an overcompensation of the benefits of innovation over all according 
costs. The latter also contain indirect costs such as losses from a decreasing market share that is caused 
by tax-induced rent-shifting. 
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Of special importance is the value of α . If the knowledge parameter is sufficiently high 
the necessary conditions for a stringent tax policy in period 1 appear to be not overly 
restrictive.  
 
In the following section this conclusion will be challenged by introducing bilateral 
knowledge accumulation with asymmetric knowledge parameters. 
3.  Bilateral Knowledge Accumulation 
In this section both firms are able to accumulate knowledge that accrues from R&D 
expenditures. Hence, both firms now dismiss end-of-pipe abatement and invest in proc-
ess integrated technologies to reduce their emissions. However, to motivate a domestic 
first-mover behaviour an asymmetric factor has to be introduced. By differentiating the 
knowledge parameters on the basis of their strength into foreign and domestic types this 
fundamental requirement is met. To keep the different versions of the model coherent, 
the domestic knowledge parameters are assumed to be higher than their foreign pen-
dants (see below for details). 
3.1.  Basic Modifications 
Since both firms are able to benefit from knowledge accumulation (8) becomes: 
 
 ( ) iiii I212 ⋅+⋅= βκκ  (8´) 
 
Another novelty is the differentiation of the knowledge parameters which is needed to 
allow for an asymmetry in the otherwise symmetric game. For the following we shall 
assume  with . It follows that 
. Therefore, (7) changes to: 
fdfd ββαα >>> 0,,, >fdfd ββαα
ffdd βαβα +>+
 
  (7´) iii I11 ⋅= ακ
3.2.  Decisions in period 2 
In stage 6 firms choose their optimal period 2 quantities. Differentiating (10) with re-
spect to quantities yields: 
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For the comparative static analysis the results from section 2.2. apply. 
 
In stage 5 R&D expenditures are set by differentiating (11) with respect to R&D expen-
ditures. This yields the following first-order conditions which now comprise the modi-
fied knowledge parameters: 
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Following the argument in section 2.2. domestic and foreign R&D expenditures con-
tinue to be strategic substitutes. Now, however, four reaction functions emerge because 
both firms are able to accumulate knowledge intertemporally. Consequently, whenever 
intratemporal and intertemporal reaction functions are downward-sloping the signs of 
the cross derivatives fdd II 222
2 ∂∂Π∂  and dfd II 2222 ∂∂Π∂  as well as the signs of the in-
tertemporal derivatives ddd II 12
2 ∂∂Π∂  and ddd II 212 ∂∂Π∂  can be determined. 
 
Lemma 2. Downward-sloping reaction functions imply negative cross derivatives 
fdd II 222
2 ∂∂Π∂  and dfd II 2222 ∂∂Π∂  and positive intertemporal derivatives ddd II 122 ∂∂Π∂  
and ddd II 21
2 ∂∂Π∂ . 
 
Proof. (see Appendix A 7) 
 
Again, differentiating (12) with respect to tax rates yields stage 4 first-order conditions 
which can be rearranged to obtain the equilibrium tax policies in period 2: 
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These optimal regulation schedules give rise to the well-established strategic effects that 
were discussed in section 2.2.  
3.3.  Decisions in period 1 
Optimisation of (10) in stage 3 leads to the following first-order conditions: 
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In stage 2 both firms now maximise intertemporal profits (11.1) which yields: 
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This result can be interpreted as its counterpart in the original model. 
 
Finally, due to the introduction of bilateral knowledge accumulation both governments 
maximise intertemporal welfare (12.1) in stage 1: 
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The optimal tax rates consequently are: 
 (40) 
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It is evident that both optimal regulation schedules in the first modification of the model 
have the same qualitative properties. Both firms now are able to accumulate knowledge 
intertemporally and therefore benefit from the intertemporal innovation effects. Fur-
thermore, this modification leads to the incorporation of the intertemporal indirect rent-
shifting effect known from (28) in both equilibrium regulation schedules. Again, the 
same questions as in the basic version come to the fore: Will the domestic government 
set a unilaterally higher tax rate in period 1 and will it be set above the Pigouvian level? 
 
Proposition 4. The domestic government will set a higher tax rate in period 1 than the 
foreign government. 
 
Proof. (see Appendix A 8) 
 
Proposition 5. The domestic government will set a tax rate above the Pigouvian level in 
period 1 if the policy adjustment condition, the existence condition, and the predomi-
nance condition hold. 
 
Proof. (see Appendix A 9) 
 
The introduction of bilateral knowledge accumulation – while the asymmetry is main-
tained through different knowledge parameters – demonstrates that the original results 
are weakened. Qualitatively, the effects are equivalent except for the additional rent-
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shifting effect. Quantitative differences arise from the specific magnitudes of the 
knowledge parameters. Still, the domestic government will set a higher tax rate than its 
foreign counterpart. Whether this tax rate exceeds the Pigouvian level is not easy to 
clarify since the governing effects are ambiguous. But if  is sufficiently high a do-
mestic tax rate above the Pigouvian level becomes optimal. 
dα
4.  Conclusion 
The previous results give rise to a revaluation of the conventional prediction of strategic 
environmental policy games, namely that tax policies most likely will be subject to the 
forces of ecological dumping. We assert that this outcome is the inevitable consequence 
of using a one-period game to investigate an inherently dynamic topic. Introducing a 
two-period game, however, allows for taking the dynamic properties of knowledge crea-
tion into account. To be sure, we concede that an approach which analyses only initial 
R&D expenditures very likely will lead to the prediction that governments should install 
a lax tax policy. But our results suggest that the incorporation of the benefits from 
building upon and improving previous knowledge may result in a stringent first-mover 
policy. 
This prediction is of course contingent upon the respective environment. It has been 
shown that a scenario with unilateral domestic knowledge accumulation facilitates the 
policy recommendations: If for whatever reason the foreign firm is incapable of apply-
ing a knowledge-based approach to its efforts in reducing emissions the domestic firm 
may very likely benefit from intertemporal innovation effects which renders a stringent 
first-mover tax policy the optimal choice for the domestic government. Even in a world 
with bilateral knowledge accumulation this recommendation can be maintained if the 
domestic firm has higher knowledge parameters. The transnational difference between 
the latter may for instance describe that the domestic firm is savvier regarding its 
knowledge-based activities. 
Although we believe that the previous results shed new light on the regulation-
competitiveness debate we acknowledge that our model lacks some important features. 
First, we did not include knowledge spillovers to avoid further ambiguities. It is, how-
ever, reasonable to predict that the domestic policymaker has an incentive to curb the 
stringency of its regulation if domestic knowledge can be imitated without or with only 
insignificant costs by foreign competitors. A domestic firm facing a stringent regulation 
may therefore be worse off if it is not able to sufficiently appropriate the benefits from 
its R&D efforts. Second, problems may arise if policymakers have imperfect informa-
tion. In this case the governments may not know about the difference in the knowledge 
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parameters and therefore have to base their policy choice on possibly crude estimations 
of the underlying dependencies. Consequently, they may either under- or overestimate 
the benefits from learning and set a too lax or too stringent tax rate. Third, as usual in 
strategic environmental policy models we entirely omitted considerations of different 
attitudes towards risks. Undertaking R&D is a chancy endeavour and it is by no means 
guaranteed that it results in a marketable innovation. Nevertheless, an educated guess is 
that a venturesome firm will react quite differently to a stringent emission tax compared 
to a risk-averse rival. 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, our results show that a stringent tax policy is the 
optimal choice whenever (1) only the firms located under the policymaker’s jurisdiction 
are able to accumulate knowledge over time or whenever (2) the differences between 
the transnational knowledge parameters are significant. Moreover, the latter bears an 
interesting implication. Given that the difference between  and  needs to be sig-
nificant to guarantee the predominance condition to hold it follows that an increase in 
 increases marginal domestic welfare. Hence, a stringent tax policy will remain inef-
fective if firm level knowledge-based capabilities are insufficient. 
dα fα
dα
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
A 1 
 
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to the domestic tax rate leads to the follow-
ing equation system:15 
 
 ( )
( ) ⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
∂∂
∂
∂∂
∂
=
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
⋅
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
Π∂
∂∂
Π∂
∂∂
Π∂
∂
Π∂
d
t
f
t
f
d
t
d
t
d
d
t
f
t
d
t
d
t
f
t
f
t
d
t
f
t
f
t
f
t
d
t
d
t
d
t
d
t
tq
C
tq
C
dt
dq
dt
dq
qqq
qqq
2
2
2
22
2
2
2
 (42) 
 
Using (13) and solving (42) with Cramer’s Rule yields: 
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15 Since these effects are equivalent in both periods the following holds throughout the game (hence sub-
scripts t). 
 27
Strategic Environmental Policy and the Accumulation of Knowledge 
 
( )
( )
0
222
2
222
2
2
2
>
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂∂
∂⋅∂∂
Π∂−∂∂
∂⋅∂
Π∂
=∂∂
∂
∂∂
Π∂
∂∂
∂
∂
Π∂
=
q
d
t
d
t
d
d
t
f
t
f
t
d
t
f
t
f
d
t
d
t
q
d
t
f
t
f
d
t
f
t
f
t
d
t
d
t
d
d
t
d
t
d
t
f
t
H
tq
C
qqtq
C
q
H
tq
C
qq
tq
C
q
t
q
d
d  (43b) 
 
Due to the assumptions about the cost and emission functions 02 >∂∂∂ dtdtd tqC  and 02 =∂∂∂ dtftf tqC . 
 
 
A 2 
 
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to domestic R&D expenditures yields the 
following equation system: 
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Using (13) and solving (44) by Cramer’s Rule yields: 
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Due to 0>∂∂ dtdt Iκ  and the assumptions about the cost functions 02 <∂∂∂ dtdtd IqC  and 
02 =∂∂∂ dtftf IqC . 
 
 
A 3 
 
Totally differentiating first-order conditions (16) and (17) yields 
 
 ( ) 02222222222 =∂∂Π∂+∂Π∂ ffddddd IIIII dd  (46a) 
 ( ) 02222222222 =∂∂Π∂+∂Π∂ ddfffff IIIII dd , (46b) 
 
which can be solved to 
 
 ( ) 00 22222222
222
2
2
2 <∂∂Π∂<
∂Π∂
∂∂Π∂−= fdd
dd
fdd
f
d
II
I
II
I
I  for
d
d  (46c) 
 ( ) 00 22222222
222
2
2
2 <∂∂Π∂<
∂Π∂
∂∂Π∂−= dfd
ff
dff
d
f
II
I
II
I
I  for
d
d  (46d) 
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A 4 
 
Were the game completely symmetric the symmetry of  and  would imply that in equilibrium 
. This requires that the foreign government’s foc (27) is satisfied: 
d
1Π f1Π
fd tt 11 =
 
 0
1
1
11
1 =∂
∂⋅′+∂
∂−∂
Π∂
f
f
ff
f
t
et
t
D
t
 (47) 
 
However, the domestic government’s foc (29) is only satisfied when the additional intertemporal innova-
tion effects (IIE)16 are taken into consideration. 
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1 =+∂
∂⋅′+∂
∂−∂
Π∂ IIEd
d
dd
d
t
et
t
D
t
 (48) 
 
Since the IIE are positive this means that domestic marginal welfare is still increasing at the symmetric 
equilibrium in (47). Therefore, . fd tt 11 >
 
 
A 5 
 
Due to the setting of the model, deriving clear-cut results is not possible. However, the differences be-
tween intra- and intertemporal results allow for a qualitative prediction. To highlight these differences we 
begin with the domestic firm’s foc in period 2. Rearranging 20) yields: 
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 (49) 
 
At the Pigouvian level the term in the first parenthesis becomes zero. Therefore, in its stringent variant 
dd eDt 22 ∂∂>  multiplication of the first and the second parenthesis, which contains the numerator of the 
familiar negative multiplier, yields a negative term. Consequently, to satisfy the according foc the subse-
quent positive terms (these are the innovation effects) need to be sufficiently strong. 
 
The existence of an innovation effect requires a positive balance of the effects that the domestic tax policy 
exercises on domestic R&D expenditures. Hence, the sign of the sum of the effects in the last parenthesis 
has to be positive which implies the following necessary condition: 
 
 1
2
2
2
2 >⋅∂
∂−⋅⋅∂
∂⋅′ βκβκ d
d
d
d
f CqqP  (50) 
 
Satisfaction of (50) demands that the cost-reducing (part of the innovation effect) and the cross-quantity-
shifting effect (part of the indirect innovation effect) exceed the last unit of induced R&D expenditures. It 
is revealing that (50) emphasises the impact of β : The larger the knowledge parameter the stronger the 
innovation effects of own R&D expenditures.  
                                                 
16 These are the tax-increasing intertemporal indirect innovation effect and the intertemporal innovation 
effect. 
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The predominance condition for an innovation offset is captured in the second necessary condition: 
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(51) demands that the absolute value of the tax-decreasing effects needs to be less than the absolute value 
of the induced innovation effects (given that (50) holds]. Hence, by (50) and (51) an intratemporally 
stringent regulation may only be issued for a sufficiently large β . 
To eventually obtain dd eDt 22 ∂∂> , which means that the first parenthesis in (49) has a negative sign, the 
sufficient condition is 022 =∂Φ∂ dd t  which is the domestic foc in stage 4. If the necessary conditions hold ( )dd eDt 22 ∂∂−  becomes positive if 022 =∂Φ∂ dd t . 
 
 
A 6 
 
To evaluate the intertemporal effect the results of stage 1 need to be considered. Rearranging (29) yields: 
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(52) reveals the policy adjustment condition: 
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Condition (53) implies that the emission-reducing effect of induced domestic innovations must not be 
overcompensated by an emission-increasing effect. The latter may occur when relative emission reduc-
tions are dwarfed by a rise in total domestic emissions due to increased domestic quantities (see footnote 
13). Assuming a predominance of the emission-reducing effect gives rise to a laxer domestic tax policy in 
period 2. 
However, (53) might not be important at all because either part of the remaining effects may be strong 
enough to shape the regulation schedule. But since the use of general functions does not allow for such a 
simplification (53) is binding. 
 
The counterpart to the existence condition (50) is: 
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Condition (54) demands that the sum of all domestic innovation effects exceeds the last unit of tax-
induced R&D. By virtue of knowledge accumulation now both intra- and intertemporal innovation effects 
become effective. Hence, (54) is weaker and therefore more likely to hold than (50). 
Consequently, and according to the previous approach the necessary predominance condition is: 
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Again, by (55) the absolute value of the tax-decreasing effects needs to be less in magnitude than the 
absolute value of the induced innovation effects (given that (53) and (54) hold). To allow for a larger 
RHS α  needs to be sufficiently large to exploit the effect of accumulated knowledge.17 And since by 
definition βα >  a stringent tax policy in period 1 becomes more likely when one allows for knowledge 
accumulation. Thus, condition (55) is weaker in comparison to the predominance condition in the in-
tratemporal case. 
In the intertemporal case the sufficient condition is the intertemporal foc: If the necessary conditions hold 
a stringent domestic tax policy in period 1, that is a positive expression ( )dd eDt 11 ∂∂− , can be obtained if 
the foc 01 =∂Φ∂ dd t  holds. 
 
 
A 7 
 
Totally differentiating the domestic intertemporal first-order condition yields: 
 
 ( ) 0111222121212 =∂∂Π∂+∂∂Π∂+∂Π∂ ffddddddddd IIIIIIII ddd  (56a) 
 ( ) 0222222221122 =∂∂Π∂+∂Π∂+∂∂Π∂ ffddddddddd IIIIIIII ddd  (56b) 
 
First, solving equation (56b) for  yields: dI1d
 
 ( ) f
ddd
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d
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dd
d I
II
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II 2
12
2
22
2
2
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2
2
2
2
1 ddd ∂∂Π∂
∂∂Π∂−∂∂Π∂
∂Π∂−=  (56c) 
 
Reinserting equation (56c) into equation (56a) yields: 
 
 ( ) ffddddfdddfddd IIIIIIIIII 2222212112211221 ddd ∂∂Π∂⋅∂Π∂+∂∂Π∂⋅∂∂Π∂−=Δ  (56d) 
 with ( ) ( )( ) 01222122222121 <∂∂Π∂⋅∂∂Π∂+∂Π∂−⋅∂Π∂=Δ dddddddddd IIIIII  
 
01 <Δ  is a stability condition which ensures that intratemporal effects dominate intertemporal effects. 
 
Second, solving equation (56b) for  yields: dI2d
 
 ( ) ( ) fdd
fdd
d
dd
ddd
d I
I
III
I
III 22
2
2
22
2
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2
2
12
2
2 ddd ∂Π∂
∂∂Π∂−∂Π∂
∂∂Π∂−=  (56e) 
 
Reinserting equation (56e) into equation (56a) yields: 
 
 ( ) ffdddddffddddd IIIIIIIIII 2222212111222212 ddd ∂∂Π∂⋅∂∂Π∂+∂∂Π∂⋅∂Π∂−=Δ  (56f) 
 with ( ) ( ) 01222122122222 >∂∂Π∂⋅∂∂Π∂−∂Π∂⋅∂Π∂=Δ dddddddddd IIIIII  
 
02 >Δ  is a stability condition which ensures that intratemporal effects dominate intertemporal effects. 
 
                                                 
17 Note that the domestic firm need not consider an intertemporal indirect rent-shifting effect. 
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From (42d) the reactions of  with respect to foreign R&D expenditures from both periods can be 
calculated: 
dI2d
 
 ( ) 00 222
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2
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fdddd
f
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d
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(57a) merely replicates the result known from (46c). (57b), however, additionally requires 
012
2 >∂∂Π∂ ddd II  to allow for a downward-sloping intertemporal reaction function. That is to say, R&D 
expenditures in period 1 increase the marginal effect of period 2 R&D expenditures on intertemporal 
domestic profits. The intuition behind this is straightforward: Due to the endurance of early knowledge 
capital the effect of subsequent R&D activities is increased because the latter can build upon existent 
knowledge. 
 
The reactions of  with respect to foreign R&D expenditures from both periods can be interpreted 
accordingly. The reactions can be inferred from (56f): 
dI1d
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A 8 
 
As before, an entirely symmetric game would entail . In equilibrium the foreign government’s foc 
(39) has to be satisfied. Contrary to the setting with unilateral knowledge accumulation the foreign firm 
now also benefits from intertemporal innovation effects: 
fd tt 11 =
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ff
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Simultaneously, the domestic government’s foc (38) has to be satisfied: 
 
 ( ) 0
1
1
11
1 =+∂
∂⋅′+∂
∂−∂
Π∂ d
d
d
dd
d
t
et
t
D
t
αIIE  (59) 
 
Both ( )fαIIE  and ( )dαIIE  are positive. However, since  it follows that fd αα > ( ) ( )fd αα IIEIIE > . 
Thus, at (58)  is still increasing (that is, (59) is not satisfied), which proofs that . dt1 fd tt 11 >
 
 
A 9 
 
Similar to the proof of proposition 3 the domestic government’s period 1 foc (38) can be rearranged to 
obtain: 
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 (60) 
 
It follows that three necessary conditions have to hold to allow for a stringent domestic tax policy: 
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Condition (61) again captures the policy adjustment effect and demands that the emission-reducing effect 
of induced domestic innovations is stronger or at least equal to the emission-increasing effect of a rise in 
total domestic quantities. 
The existence condition is: 
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Condition (62) demands that the sum of all domestic innovation effects exceeds the last unit of induced 
R&D expenditures. If this existence condition holds an innovation effect occurs. 
The predominance condition is: 
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Qualitatively the predominance condition (63) corresponds to (55) insofar as it also demands the tax-
decreasing effects to be less in magnitude than the induced innovation effects. However, due to (1) the 
introduction of the intertemporal indirect rent-shifting effect and (2)  there is a quantitative dif-
ference. If the difference between  and  becomes marginal the additional rent-shifting effect may 
produce an impact on a scale that violates the predominance condition which would obviate innovation 
offsets. Consequently, (63) is stronger than (55).  
fd αα >
dα fα
The sufficient condition, in turn, is the according foc. That is to say for ( ) 011 >∂∂− dd eDt  to hold 
01 =∂Φ∂ dd t  has to hold, too. 
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